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Ethiopia’s Regulatory Sandbox: How NBE Directive No. FS/01/2026 Can Advance Financial Innovation, Competition and Inclusion

By Haymanot & Advocates 20 November 2026 11 min read

Ethiopia’s Regulatory Sandbox: How NBE Directive No. FS/01/2026 Can Advance Financial Innovation, Competition and Inclusion

Introduction

The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) has issued the Regulatory Sandbox Directive No. FS/01/2026 (hereinafter the “Regulatory Sandbox Directive/Directive”), which entered into force on 17 November 2026. The Directive was issued pursuant to the National Bank of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1359/2025 and the Banking Business Proclamation No. 1360/2025, and it establishes a supervised framework within which innovative financial products, services, business models and delivery channels may be tested live, for a limited time, under the control and oversight of the NBE, prior to authorization or licensing. The Regulatory Sandbox Directive follows a period of rapid change in Ethiopia’s financial sector. Recent reforms have opened the banking and fintech sectors to new participants, raised the standards expected of existing institutions and increased the importance of digital financial services. In this environment, a recurring regulatory difficulty has been that innovation moves faster than the rules written to govern it. An innovator that wishes to introduce a new product frequently cannot tell whether existing licensing categories and requirements will accommodate it, and the regulator, for its part, has limited evidence on which to base a decision. The sandbox is designed to address this difficulty. It allows both sides to learn from controlled, real-world testing before a final regulatory position is taken. This article examines the Directive and, in particular, the ways in which it is likely to affect the Ethiopian financial sector positively. It proceeds from the premise that the sandbox is neither a deregulatory measure nor a shortcut to licensing. It provides a structured framework for responsible innovation, allowing flexibility where justified while maintaining robust safeguards to protect consumers and preserve financial stability.

1. The Sandbox Framework at a Glance

1.1 Who the Directive Applies To

The Regulatory Sandbox Directive  applies to financial institutions, to entities that have applied for a financial institution licence, and to entities that have applied to  NBE for designation as a new category of financial institution, provided that they seek to test a proposed financial innovation through the sandbox. “Financial institution” is defined broadly and includes banks, insurance companies, reinsurers, microfinance institutions, micro insurance companies, payment instrument issuers, payment system operators, capital goods finance companies, money transfer institutions and other similar institutions determined and licensed by the NBE. Applicants may apply individually or jointly with one or more eligible entities. This scope has an important practical consequence. A technology start-up that holds no licence and has not applied for one is not itself an eligible applicant. Its route into the sandbox is through a joint application with a licensed institution, or through having applied for a licence or for designation as a new category of institution. The framework therefore encourages partnership between established institutions and technology-driven entrants, a point to which we return below.

1.2 Eligibility

Under Article 5, an applicant must demonstrate that its innovation falls within, or is likely to fall within, the NBE’s supervisory scope; that it provides measurable benefits to consumers or addresses specific gaps in the sector, such as access, affordability, quality, efficiency, risk management or cost reduction; and that it is genuinely innovative or a substantial enhancement of an existing product, service or business model. The applicant must further show why a sandbox is necessary, identifying the constraints that existing laws place on deployment. It must also show adequate capacity, resources and governance, that the innovation has been sufficiently developed and validated, a description of its technical architecture, and a feasible plan for full commercialization after testing. A project manager and a dedicated test team, who must satisfy fit and proper requirements, must be appointed under written authorization.

1.3 The Admission Process

The process is staged and carries defined timelines. NBE issues a public call for applications at least twice a year, and it may issue additional calls. An initial application is assessed within ten working days, after which the applicant is told whether it is accepted, conditionally accepted or declined. An accepted applicant then submits the full admission documents, including a board resolution, any consortium agreement, fit and proper questionnaires, identification and police clearance documents, and a business plan covering risk management, consumer protection and exit. NBE issues an admission letter within twenty working days of receiving all required documents. The admitted applicant then submits a detailed test plan, which  NBE reviews within thirty working days before issuing a testing approval letter. Testing may last for up to twelve months and must commence within thirty days of the testing approval letter. An extension of up to a further twelve months may be granted where the participant shows substantial progress and continued compliance.

1.4 Regulatory Support

Article 11 allows NBE to grant eligible participants rule waivers or modifications that are strictly necessary for testing, together with tailored regulatory guidance, including coordination with other government bodies on matters outside the NBE’s mandate. These benefits are carefully bounded. Fit and proper requirements, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing requirements, consumer protection, data privacy and cybersecurity laws, and the requirement of permanent licensing for post-testing market entry continue to apply in all cases. The participant remains fully liable for any loss or harm, including harm arising from activities conducted under a waiver.

2. How the Directive Can Benefit the Financial Sector

2.1 Opening the Market to Genuine Competition

One of the most significant effects of the Directive is likely to be on competition, because it lowers the barriers that keep new entrants and new business models out of the financial market. Licensing frameworks are generally built around established categories of institution. Where a business model does not fit those categories, an innovator faces a dilemma: invest heavily in a launch without regulatory certainty, or abandon the idea. The sandbox lowers this barrier by giving innovators a legitimate and supervised way to test their offering and to obtain a clear regulatory answer at the end of the process. The scope of the Directive, which extends to applicants for a licence and to applicants for designation as a new category of financial institution, shows that NBE expects the sandbox to be used by entities that do not yet exist in the regulatory framework. This is an important signal. It indicates that new categories of institution may emerge from sandbox experience, and that the market will not be limited to its current participants. Increased competition is likely to benefit consumers directly through better pricing, improved service quality and a wider range of products. It also puts constructive pressure on incumbents to modernize. This is consistent with the Directive’s own objective of enhancing competition and improving efficiency.

2.2 Advancing Financial Inclusion

The Directive expressly ties eligibility to measurable consumer benefit and to the improvement of access and affordability. Innovations that are most likely to be tested are those that reach people and businesses presently underserved by conventional channels, such as digital savings and credit products, mobile and agent-based services, low-cost remittances and insurance products designed for smallholders and small enterprises. The testing model suits such innovations well. Because the NBE may require limits on the number and profile of participating consumers and on transaction volumes, a product aimed at an underserved segment can be tried with a small group, its effects observed, and its design adjusted before it reaches a wider population. That reduces the risk that vulnerable customers bear the cost of design flaws, and it increases the likelihood that products reaching the market are well suited to the people they are meant to serve.

2.3 Regulation Informed by Evidence

The sandbox benefits the regulator as much as the innovator. The Directive requires participants to submit progress reports, to give NBE access to records, systems and data, and, at the end of testing, to submit an assessment report covering test results, customer adoption, regulatory challenges encountered, lessons learned and residual risks. The assessment report must also include recommendations for regulatory amendments where the results show that existing legal frameworks need change. This creates a feedback mechanism. Under Article 23, one of the possible outcomes of a test is “regulatory adjustment required”, where an innovation shows promise but cannot proceed because of an identified legal or regulatory gap. In such cases, the participant stops testing and may apply again once the necessary changes have been made. Regulation can therefore be updated on the basis of observed experience rather than speculation. For a financial sector undergoing rapid reform, this capacity to learn is a considerable advantage.

2.4 Legal Certainty and Investor Confidence

Uncertainty about how a new product will be treated is a significant deterrent to investment. The Directive reduces this uncertainty by setting out the entire life cycle of a sandbox project in advance: the eligibility criteria, the documents required, the time within which the NBE must respond at each stage, the permitted duration of testing, the possible outcomes at exit, and the period of post-exit monitoring. Applicants know in advance what they must prove, how long each decision should take, and what may follow. The right to reapply in later cohorts after rejection, and the right to appeal a rejection within thirty working days, add procedural fairness. Taken together, these features make the process predictable, and predictability is what allows an investor or an established institution to commit resources to an innovation project with confidence.

2.5 Partnerships Between Established Institutions and Innovators

Because the Directive requires applicants to be, or to be applying to become, regulated institutions, and because it expressly contemplates joint applications and consortium agreements setting out roles, responsibilities, governance and dispute resolution, it encourages collaboration. Banks, insurers and microfinance institutions bring licences, customers, balance sheets and compliance experience. Technology firms bring speed, specialized skills and new delivery models. This matters especially at a time when domestic banks, as discussed in our earlier analysis of the new banking licensing directive, face pressure to modernize in the face of growing competition. The sandbox gives domestic institutions a lower-risk way to invest in digital transformation and to try new products without waiting for rules to be clarified, and it gives them a framework in which to work with technology partners on defined, supervised terms.

2.6 Consumer Protection Built Into the Design

A notable strength of the Directive is that consumer protection is part of the structure of the sandbox, not an addition to it. Participants must inform customers in writing that the innovation is being tested under the sandbox and obtain their explicit written consent. They must disclose terms in simple and clear language, disclose risks alongside benefits, give at least ten working days’ notice and obtain explicit consent before any change that increases consumer obligations, and provide accessible redress or compensation mechanisms. Complaints must be handled through a free internal process, acknowledged promptly, and resolved within ten working days, with a unique tracking number and written outcome for each. Participants must also report certain incidents to the NBE within twenty-four hours, including breaches of sandbox conditions, cybersecurity incidents, signs of systemic complaints, financial distress and suspected money laundering or fraud. On exit, a participant must show that affected consumers have been informed and protected, and must provide a clearance from the Information Network Security Administration (INSA) or another appropriate authority confirming that no residual risk remains to financial stability, consumer protection or data security. These measures give consumers a degree of protection that is likely to build public trust in new financial products, and public trust is essential if innovation is to be adopted.

3. Safeguards That Give the Framework Credibility

The long-term success of a sandbox depends on the confidence that it is not a way to avoid regulation. The Directive addresses this in several ways. First, the NBE retains broad supervisory powers. It may suspend testing where, for example, reports are not submitted, serious malfunctions or cybersecurity weaknesses arise, or financial distress emerges, and it may terminate participation for serious regulatory breaches, failure to meet milestones, insolvency or undue risk to consumers or financial stability. A suspended participant must stop testing immediately, submit a corrective action plan within ten working days and resume within thirty working days, subject to a limited extension. The NBE also keeps the right to amend or withdraw regulatory support where risks emerge. Second, the Directive lists prohibited activities. Participants may not mislead consumers about the product, its risks or its regulatory status; imply that sandbox participation is equivalent to a licence; use consumer data beyond the test without consent; operate outside the approved test scope; change their business model without approval; continue operating after suspension; or take deposits, issue instruments or lend outside the permitted scope without approval. Administrative fines of Birr 50,000 or Birr 100,000 apply depending on the violation, and repeated or continuing violations may lead to permanent disqualification. The NBE may reduce or waive penalties where a violation was unintentional, promptly remedied and did not cause material harm. Third, the end of the process is clearly defined. The NBE classifies each test as leading to licensing or authorization, conditional or phased transition, a one-time extension for additional data, regulatory adjustment, or exit without licensing. Post-exit monitoring may continue for up to one year, and the NBE issues written confirmation once sandbox-related obligations have been closed. These features show that the sandbox gives flexibility within firm limits, and that innovation is welcomed on the condition that risk is controlled.

4. A Practical Illustration

To see how the framework operates, consider a hypothetical. A fintech company has developed a tool that assesses the creditworthiness of smallholder farmers from mobile money and phone usage data, enabling them to borrow without traditional collateral. It partners with a licensed microfinance institution. Existing rules do not clearly address this lending model, so the partners apply to the sandbox as a consortium, explaining that the product is new to Ethiopia, that it addresses a credit gap, and that a prototype is already working. After acceptance of their initial application and admission, they submit a test plan proposing to lend small amounts to a limited number of farmers in one district for a set period. The plan includes consent forms, risk disclosures, complaint procedures and an exit strategy. If one documentary requirement proves an undue obstacle to the test, the NBE may waive it for the test only, while anti-money laundering, customer due diligence, consumer protection and data protection rules continue to apply in full. If the test is successful, the partners may proceed to licensing or authorization. If it reveals a gap in the law, the NBE may require regulatory adjustment first. If it is unsatisfactory, the partners exit without licensing. In every case, the product has been tested at small scale and under supervision, so that any harm was limited and the regulator has learned something useful.

Conclusion

The Regulatory Sandbox Directive No. FS/01/2026 marks a significant step in the development of Ethiopia’s financial sector. It gives innovators and established institutions a lawful and supervised way to test new ideas; it gives the NBE the evidence to regulate with greater precision; and it gives consumers safeguards built into the testing process itself. By coupling flexibility with accountability, it supports competition, advances financial inclusion and strengthens confidence in new financial services. For banks, insurers, microfinance institutions, payment service providers and prospective entrants, the practical message is to prepare. Institutions that identify promising innovations, build capable project and test teams, establish strong risk, consumer protection and data security arrangements, and consider partnerships early will be best placed to use the sandbox when the NBE issues its next call for applications. Used well, the sandbox can help the sector become more competitive, more inclusive and more resilient.

This article is general information and not legal advice. Contact us about your specific situation.

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Legal update · Banking practice