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Corporate Governance in Ethiopia’s Financial Institutions: Regulatory Expectations and Board Responsibilities

By Haymanot & Advocates 7 November 2025 14 min read

Boardroom
  1. Introduction

Corporate governance plays a vital role in shaping the performance and integrity of financial institutions worldwide. In Ethiopia, the rapid development of the financial sector driven by the expansion of banking, insurance, and emerging fintech has prompted regulatory authorities to focus more closely on the internal structures and oversight systems that govern these institutions. At the forefront of this effort is the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), which has issued a series of governance directives specifically tailored to banks and insurance companies. These instruments aim to strengthen the role of boards, enhance internal controls, and promote transparency, prudence, and institutional accountability.

The recent issuance of the Bank Corporate Governance Directive No. SBB/91/2024 marks a significant regulatory shift. This directive, along with other directives on large exposures (SBB/87/2024), related-party transactions (SBB/88/2024), asset classification and provisioning (SBB/90/2024), significant influence (SBB/89/2024), and bank investments (SBB/92/2024) directives, signals a broad recalibration of the governance framework. While the draft Insurance Corporate Governance Directive has yet to be enacted, its provisions are also expected to shape compliance standards once in force and are therefore considered in this article. Collectively, these measures form a more robust governance architecture. They clarify the structure and composition of boards, set out the requirements for board committees particularly in the areas of audit and risk and establish the qualifications expected of senior executives.

Beyond sector-specific regulation, Ethiopia’s revised Commercial Code also reinforces governance expectations. It lays out fundamental principles concerning director duties, shareholder rights, and corporate liability, which apply to all companies, including financial institutions. Together with the NBE’s directives, the Code contributes to a more unified and comprehensive governance regime designed to promote sound management, independence, and accountability.

This article examines the evolving governance framework for financial institutions in Ethiopia, with a particular focus on banks and insurance companies. It analyzes the expectations set by the NBE, situates them within the broader context of the Commercial Code, and explores the practical implications of implementing more rigorous oversight standards. Special attention is given to board composition, the definition of roles and responsibilities, risk and compliance structures, and the growing regulatory emphasis on sustainability and stakeholder protection.

  • Appointment, Composition, Tenure, and Responsibilities of Boards of Directors in Ethiopia’s Financial Institutions
    • Legal Framework for Appointment of Directors

In Ethiopia’s financial sector, the appointment of directors is governed by both general company law and sector-specific regulatory directives. The Commercial Code provides a broad legal foundation, stating that a share company shall be managed by a board composed of a minimum of three and a maximum of thirteen directors. However, financial institutions are subject to stricter standards. The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), through its binding directives, has imposed a more elaborate and mandatory framework that reflects the systemic importance of banks and insurers.

According to both the Bank Corporate Governance Directive No. SBB/91/2024 and the Draft Insurance Corporate Governance Directive No. SIB/2025, every financial institution is required to form an ad hoc nomination and election committee ahead of any board election. This committee must be composed of five members, including at least two non-influential shareholders, defined as those holding less than two percent of the subscribed capital. The committee is barred from including any current director or employee of the institution. It is tasked with receiving and vetting board nominations and is required to ensure that the number of nominees is at least double the number of seats available. Furthermore, the institution’s company secretary must publish the eligibility criteria for board nomination at least one month before the general shareholders’ meeting, using public and digital communication channels to ensure shareholder awareness.

Once nominated, directors are elected according to a three-list system. One-third of board members are elected exclusively by non-influential shareholders, one-third by all shareholders without restriction, and the remaining one-third must be independent directors nominated by the existing board and elected by all shareholders. These categories must be voted on separately, and each nominee is elected based on a majority vote within their respective category.

Notably, all elected directors must undergo a fit-and-proper assessment by the NBE before assuming office. The institution is required to submit the list of elected directors and all relevant documentation to the NBE within twenty working days of the general meeting. The NBE is then obligated to provide its decision within fifteen working days. A person may not begin to serve as a director before obtaining regulatory approval.

  • Fit-and-Proper Criteria and Disqualifications

The NBE directives set out comprehensive fit-and-proper standards that all director nominees must meet. These criteria include demonstrable personal integrity, the absence of any record of fraudulent conduct, criminal conviction, or regulatory sanction, and a track record of ethical behavior. Nominees must also possess professional competence and sector-relevant experience, particularly in areas such as banking, insurance, finance, law, and corporate governance.

Legal entities may be nominated to serve as directors, provided that the individual who will represent the entity on the board is explicitly disclosed during the nomination process and independently meets the NBE’s eligibility requirements. These requirements are enforced both prior to appointment and on an ongoing basis. Directors are expected to proactively disclose any developments that may impair their eligibility, and institutions must maintain a formal register of such declarations.

  • Board Composition and Independence

In recognition of the complexity and systemic significance of financial institutions, both directives mandate that boards must consist of at least nine members surpassing the general minimum set by the Commercial Code. This larger board size is intended to provide the breadth of expertise necessary for effective oversight across risk, audit, strategy, and compliance functions.

The composition of the board must reflect a mix of expertise, experience, and diversity. The NBE explicitly requires that board members, taken collectively, must possess competencies in finance, accounting, insurance, investment, legal affairs, risk management, information technology, and sustainability. Additionally, the directives require that every board include at least two female directors. Institutions are required to adopt a board diversity policy to ensure gender balance, academic breadth, and sectoral knowledge across the boardroom.

A cornerstone of good governance is independence. To this end, One-third of the board is to be nominated and voted by non-influential shareholders, shareholders who hold < 2% of the total subscribed capital, one-third must be independent directors nominated by the board and elected by all shareholders, and the remaining one-third must be nominated and voted by all shareholders. It requires that at least one-third of all directors must be independent. An independent director is defined as a person with no managerial role, no close family relationship with any executive or board member, and no significant financial or business dealings with the institution within the past two years. Persons with pending legal disputes against the institution, or those who have received loans in excess of fifty million birr, are categorically disqualified from being considered independent.

To further enhance board autonomy, the number of employee-directors is capped at two. Neither the Chief Executive Officer nor any other executive may serve as chairperson of the board. In addition, each board is required to elect a chairperson and vice chairperson from among its members. This requirement, though not stipulated in the Commercial Code, is made mandatory under the NBE directives.

  • Term of Office and Rotation Mechanisms

To promote board renewal while preserving institutional knowledge, both directives limit the maximum duration of continuous service. A director may not serve more than two consecutive three-year terms, totaling six years. Reappointment is permitted only after a six-year interval. However, as an exception, shareholders may re-elect up to one-third of the outgoing board members for one additional term to ensure leadership continuity. Beyond this threshold, all other seats must be filled with new members.

In the event that the board loses quorum specifically, if the number of serving directors falls below half of the total board members, the remaining members are under an obligation to convene an extraordinary general meeting to fill the vacant positions. Outgoing directors continue to serve until the NBE has approved the incoming appointees.

  • Core Responsibilities and Legal Duties of Directors

The responsibilities of directors in Ethiopia’s financial institutions are framed by both the Commercial Code and the NBE’s sectoral directives. As fiduciaries, directors are required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the institution. This encompasses a duty of care, requiring directors to perform their functions with the diligence and skill of a prudent person in a similar position, and a duty of loyalty, obliging them to avoid self-dealing, conflicts of interest, or preferential treatment of certain shareholders.

The Bank and Insurance Governance Directives expand on these duties by requiring directors to promote the long-term sustainability of the institution. This includes acting fairly towards policyholders, depositors, creditors, employees, and the wider community. In the case of insurers, the directives explicitly prioritize the interests of policyholders above those of shareholders.

Directors must exercise independent judgment, refrain from abusing their position, maintain confidentiality, and prevent fraudulent or illegal practices. They are also required to resist undue political, personal, or ownership-based influence in the discharge of their duties. Liability for breach of duty is codified: directors who cause harm through negligence or recklessness may be held financially responsible for losses suffered by the institution or its stakeholders.

Furthermore, board members are subject to an annual performance evaluation, and any director who fails to attend at least 75% of board meetings may be subject to removal by shareholder resolution, upon recommendation by the board.

  • Board Committees: Roles in Oversight and Accountability

In the Ethiopian financial sector, board committees serve as vital instruments for implementing effective governance and ensuring institutional accountability. The NBE, through its binding corporate governance directives for banks and insurance companies, mandates the establishment of key board subcommittees to reinforce internal control, manage institutional risk, and align corporate decisions with long-term strategic and regulatory goals. These committees are not peripheral bodies; rather, they are core to the operation of any sound financial institution.

Both directives require financial institutions to establish, at a minimum, three essential board-level committees: the Audit Committee, the Risk Management and Compliance Committee, and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. While the overall responsibility for oversight lies with the full board, these committees are entrusted with specialized functions that support the board in discharging its duties with the rigor and granularity required in modern corporate governance frameworks. Although boards may delegate certain tasks to committees, they cannot relinquish their overarching responsibilities.

  • Audit committee

The Audit Committee holds a foundational place in the financial oversight structure. It is charged with independently monitoring the integrity of financial statements, reviewing internal control systems, and overseeing the performance of both external and internal auditors. The directive for banks specifies that the audit committee must comprise at least three directors who are not employees of the bank, with at least one member being an independent director. This configuration helps to insulate the committee from potential managerial influence and reinforces its objective role in oversight. Though not identically worded, the insurance directive echoes this same governance logic.

  • Risk Management and Compliance Committee

In addition to financial controls, the role of the Risk Management and Compliance Committee is becoming increasingly important in the face of dynamic operational, credit, and reputational risks, as well as in response to sustainability-related challenges. This committee is responsible for reviewing and advising on the institution’s risk appetite, monitoring the risk profile of the business, and ensuring compliance with legal and internal obligations. It is also tasked with supporting the board’s responsibility to establish a risk governance framework that follows the widely recognized “three lines of defense” model. This model separates business-line risk management (first line), risk oversight and compliance (second line), and internal audit (third line), and is explicitly required in both banking and insurance contexts. The committee must meet at least quarterly and maintain direct oversight over the Chief Risk Officer, who must be independent and report directly to the committee without impediment.

  • Nomination and Remuneration Committee

Meanwhile, both directives outline the structure and duties of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, which plays a pivotal role in appointing, evaluating, and compensating senior management and board members. This committee is responsible for identifying candidates for independent directorship, proposing senior executive nominations, and recommending the employment and removal of the CEO and senior officers. It also formulates the bank’s or insurer’s compensation strategy, ensuring alignment with prudent risk-taking, ethical conduct, and sustainability objectives. To avoid dominance by any one individual or faction, the committee must consist of at least four directors and promote balanced board dynamics.

Each of these committees must function under a formal charter approved by the full board. This document should specify each committee’s composition, duties, meeting frequency, and reporting lines.

  • Conflict of Interest and Related-Party Transactions

In Ethiopia’s regulated financial sector, the effective governance of conflict of interest and related-party transactions is both a legal obligation and a fundamental pillar of institutional integrity. NBE has adopted a layered and rigorous approach to ensure that board decisions and business transactions are made impartially, without favoring insiders. This framework is reflected in a series of interrelated directives, notably SBB/91/2024, SBB/88/2024, SBB/87/2024, SBB/89/2024, and SBB/90/2024 for banks, and the Draft Insurance Corporate Governance Directive (2025) for insurers.

  • Conflict of Interest: Institutional Policy and Individual Disclosure

Conflicts of interest are addressed directly in Article 8 of both the bank and insurance directives. Each institution must establish a conflict-of-interest policy, approved by the board, Directors are required to declare any conflict before or during board meetings, and they must abstain from voting or discussion on matters where they have a conflicting interest.

 These requirements ensure that decisions are taken based solely on institutional merit, not personal advantage. Importantly, individuals with significant influence over a bank, such as board members or large shareholders, are held to a high fiduciary standard. They must exercise independent judgment and avoid participating in any transaction that could present divided loyalties. Article 8 of Directive SBB/89/2024 also underscores this responsibility by requiring such persons to always act in the best interest of the institution.

  • Related Parties: Scope and Regulatory Definitions

The regulatory definition of a related party is intentionally broad to capture both direct and indirect influence. As provided under Article 2.10 of Directive SBB/88/2024 for banks and Article 2.17 of the Draft Insurance Directive, related parties include board members, the chief executive officer, senior officers, influential shareholders (those holding two percent or more of total subscribed capital), and their immediate family members namely, spouses, parents, and children. In addition, any company where such individuals own ten percent or more of the equity or serve in senior management is considered related. For state-owned financial institutions, government-owned enterprises are also defined as related parties, ensuring full transparency where public entities may engage in preferential arrangements.

This wide net is meant to prevent circumvention of rules through proxies, family, or affiliated legal entities. It reflects the NBE’s recognition that influence in a financial institution may not always be overt but can nonetheless distort market discipline and fiduciary responsibility.

It sets the tone for how financial institutions must treat their related parties: all transactions must be conducted at arm’s length. This means that pricing, interest rates, collateral requirements, repayment schedules, and other terms must be no more favorable than those offered to unrelated third parties in similar circumstances. Preferential treatment is prohibited, and any deviation from this principle may be regarded as an abuse of position or insider dealing.

The directive goes further by requiring advance internal oversight of high-risk related-party transactions. As per the directive, any related-party transaction exceeding Birr 15 million or carrying material risk must be approved by the full board of directors, based on a prior opinion from the audit committee. The committee is responsible for assessing the fairness and risk implications of the transaction. Critically, any director with a conflict must recuse themselves from all deliberations and voting on the matter.

To further insulate institutions from risk concentration, the NBE imposes prudential exposure caps on related-party lending. According to the directive, a bank may not expose more than fifteen percent of its total capital to a single related party, and total exposure to all related parties may not exceed thirty-five percent. Should these limits be exceeded, the bank must immediately report the breach to the NBE and may be compelled to demand additional collateral, restructure the transaction, or terminate the exposure. The same rules apply in the context of connected counterparties under the Large Exposures Directive, which requires exposures to economically linked entities to be aggregated and treated as a single exposure, subject to a combined limit of twenty-five percent of capital.

These quantitative thresholds serve to contain systemic risk and ensure that financial institutions remain diversified in their credit exposures, especially when dealing with insiders or affiliated enterprises.

  • Loan Classification and Risk Provisioning

If a related-party transaction becomes distressed, the asset must be classified and provisioned without exception. Directive SBB/90/2024 makes it clear that related-party loans must be treated on the same basis as all other loans. Under this directive a loan’s classification is based on performance and risk, not affiliation. Thus, even if a borrower is a board member or an affiliated entity, the bank must downgrade and provision the exposure if it is non-performing, restructured under concessional terms, or lacks proper collateral. This is designed to avoid situations where affiliated loans are left under-provisioned, distorting financial statements and exposing institutions to credit losses.

  • Internal Controls, Audit, and Disclosure Obligations

Banks and insurers are also required to maintain a continuously updated related-party database, as outlined in Article 10 of SBB/88/2024. This database must be supported by automated systems and made available for internal audit, risk management, and external review. All significant related-party exposures must be reported to the NBE through prescribed templates, including monthly reports showing classifications, maturity, collateral coverage, and any restructuring arrangements. These reporting obligations are matched by mandatory review processes within the institution: the compliance function, internal audit, and risk officers must monitor related-party transactions on a continuous basis and report anomalies directly to the board or its committees.

External auditors, under Article 9 of SBB/88/2024, are further required to verify the completeness of related-party disclosures in financial statements. They must obtain evidence that such disclosures are truthful, complete, and comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Any material misstatement or omission linked to related-party arrangements could result in an adverse audit opinion or regulatory enforcement.

  • Conclusion

Ethiopia’s financial institutions are entering a new era of governance, one where boards are expected to lead with independence, competence, and accountability. The NBE has laid out clear and detailed rules that leave little room for formality without substance. From how boards are composed to how conflicts of interest are managed and related-party transactions are handled, the expectations are higher and more aligned with international standards.

At the heart of these reforms is the recognition that good governance is not just about ticking regulatory boxes it’s about building trust, managing risk, and making decisions that serve the long-term health of the institution and the wider public. As the sector grows in complexity and importance, these governance foundations will be essential for financial stability and public confidence. Strong boards, clear rules, and ethical leadership are no longer optional; they are the standard.

This article is general information and not legal advice. Contact us about your specific situation.

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Legal update · Corporate practice