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Legal Updates

Proclamation No. 1440/2026: Restructuring of the Federal Executive and What It Means for Regulated Sectors

By Haymanot & Advocates 18 November 2026 11 min read

Hands signing a document with a pen

Key changes from Proclamation No. 1263/2021, with a focus on the new reporting line of the Ethiopian Communications Authority and the Ethiopian Capital Market Authority

Key Takeaways

  • The Ethiopian Communications Authority now reports to the Ministry of Innovation and Technology instead of the Prime Minister, but its establishing law has not been amended.
  • The Ethiopian Capital Market Authority now reports to the Ministry of Finance, and the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority to the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration, with implications for capital-markets matters and merger filings.
  • The New Proclamation does not address appointments, budget approval or the protection of individual regulatory decisions.
  • Clients should check the official text, review licences and transaction documents, and confirm the status of pending regulatory matters.

1. Overview

On 7 October 2026, the House of Peoples’ Representatives reportedly approved the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1440/2026 (the “New Proclamation”). It replaces Proclamation No. 1263/2021 (the “Previous Proclamation”), which has set the structure of the federal executive since 2021.

Most of the changes are administrative: ministries are renamed, mandates are consolidated and reporting lines are redrawn. A few, however, directly affect regulated businesses and investors. The most significant is that the Ethiopian Communications Authority (ECA) now reports to the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MInT) rather than to the Prime Minister. Because the ECA regulates both Ethio telecom, the state-owned incumbent, and its private competitor, operators and investors should consider what this change means for the regulator’s independence.

This update summarizes the main changes, compares them with the Previous Proclamation and sets out the practical implications for our clients. It focuses on the ECA and the Ethiopian Capital Market Authority (ECMA), and also covers the new reporting line of the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (the competition authority).

Important Notice

This update is based on the draft text of the New Proclamation. The official version had not been published in the Federal Negarit Gazette at the time of writing. The draft does not carry a proclamation number; we use “1440/2026” as reported. Article numbers, wording and the effective date may change in the published text, which should be checked before relying on this update.

2. Key Changes at a Glance

TopicProclamation No. 1263/2021Proclamation No. 1440/2026 (draft text reviewed)
Length and form108 articles, with an annex listing renamed organs.77 articles and no annex. Renamed organs are listed in Art. 69, and ministry mandates are stated more concisely.
Designations of organsSeven designations: Ministry, Commission, Authority, Administration or Development, Service, Office and Institute (Arts. 9–15).The same seven designations are retained (Arts. 9–15).
Definition of “Authority”Accountable to a Ministry or, where there is a “potential conflict” with the activities of the institution to which it is accountable, to the Prime Minister or another government organ (Art. 11).Accountable to a Ministry, or to the Prime Minister or another government organ where a potential conflict of interest with the Ministry exists (Art. 11). The test survives, now framed expressly as a conflict of interest.
Ministries22 ministries (Art. 16).Still 22. The Ministries of Culture and Sport and of Tourism become Culture and Tourism, plus a new Youth and Sports. Planning and Development becomes National Strategy. Transport and Logistics becomes Logistics (Art. 16).
Executive organs reporting directly to the Prime Minister17 organs (Art. 79).11 organs (Art. 44).
Ministry–institution relationshipArt. 77: no interference in day-to-day activities; the ministry may perform HR and finance administration; oversight includes reviewing the institution’s structure, programs, projects and budgets.Art. 43: the institution is an “independent legal entity”; no interference in day-to-day operational management; oversight includes reviewing plans and budgets. The HR and finance administration clause and the structure review are not carried over.
New or re-established organsNot applicable.Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (under the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration), Aircraft Accident Investigation Office (under the Ministry of Logistics), and National Research Fund and Council (Art. 42).
RepealsRepealed Proclamation No. 1097/2018 and a long list of establishment laws (Art. 104).Repeals Proclamation No. 1263/2021, the GERD Public Coordination Council Regulation No. 244/2011 and the Palace Administration Proclamation No. 459/2005 (Art. 71). Art. 72 renders conflicting provisions inapplicable.
Effective dateDate of House approval, 6 October 2021 (Art. 108). Gazette publication followed on 25 January 2022.Not stated in the draft text reviewed; to be confirmed against the Federal Negarit Gazette.

3. Organs Reporting Directly to the Prime Minister

The Prime Minister’s direct portfolio is reduced from 17 organs to 11. The table below shows where each affected organ now reports:

OrganUnder No. 1263/2021Under No. 1440/2026
Ethiopian Communications AuthorityPrime MinisterMinistry of Innovation and Technology (Art. 56)
Ethiopian Capital Market AuthorityPrime MinisterMinistry of Finance (Art. 62)
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption CommissionPrime MinisterMinistry of Justice (Art. 65)
Civil Service CommissionPrime MinisterMinistry of National Strategy (Art. 51)
African Leadership Excellence AcademyPrime MinisterMinistry of National Strategy (Art. 51)
Disaster Risk Management CommissionPrime MinisterMinistry of Peace (Art. 49)
Palace AdministrationPrime MinisterPowers transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister; Proclamation No. 459/2005 repealed (Arts. 71, 73)
Republican GuardPrime MinisterNot mentioned in the draft text reviewed
Ethiopian Nuclear Energy CommissionNot listed in Art. 79Prime Minister (Art. 44)
Immigration and Citizenship ServiceNational Intelligence and Security Service (Art. 101)Prime Minister (Art. 44)

4. The Ethiopian Communications Authority

4.1. Background

The Communications Service Proclamation No. 1148/2019 established the ECA as an independent federal authority, accountable to the Prime Minister, to restructure the telecommunications market and introduce competition. It was reported at the time that the Prime Minister would appoint the ECA’s board and its chairperson.

4.1.2. What the New Proclamation Says

Article 56 places the ECA under MInT, so the intention to move it away from the Prime Minister is clear. However, the New Proclamation does not amend Proclamation No. 1148/2019, which still provides for accountability to the Prime Minister. Article 72 overrides inconsistent provisions, which supports the view that the new rule prevails, but it does not refer to the 2019 Proclamation by name. This leaves several practical questions open:

  • Appointments. The 2019 Proclamation reportedly gives the Prime Minister the power to appoint the ECA’s board. It is not clear whether this power now moves to MInT.
  • Exclusivity. It is not clear whether MInT’s oversight is exclusive or whether the Prime Minister keeps a role, for example in performance reporting.
  • Budget. The New Proclamation does not say who approves the ECA’s budget.
  • Policy and regulation. MInT’s mandate (Art. 32) does not expressly include supervising a communications regulator. Its authority comes from the Article 56 listing and the general rules in Article 43.

An amendment to Proclamation No. 1148/2019 or a Council of Ministers regulation would resolve these points.

4.1.3. The Conflict-of-Interest Test under Article 11

Under Article 11, an Authority normally reports to a ministry, but may instead report to the Prime Minister or another government body where there is a potential conflict of interest with that ministry. A similar test applied under the Previous Proclamation, when the ECA reported to the Prime Minister. Whether the test applies is a question of fact, but it would be relevant wherever the supervising ministry or its officials hold ownership or board roles in a regulated operator.

4.1.4. Article 43: Limits of the Non-Interference Rule

Article 43 treats each accountable institution as an independent legal entity and bars the ministry from interfering in its day-to-day management. This is a useful safeguard, but a limited one: the ministry still reviews the institution’s plans and budget, consolidates its reports and monitors its performance. Separate legal personality does not by itself guarantee independent decision-making, particularly where the ministry controls the budget.

4.2. State Ownership and Regulatory Oversight

The State is the controlling shareholder of Ethio telecom and, through the federal executive, also oversees its regulator. It is reportedly common in Ethiopia for senior public officials to sit on the boards of state-owned enterprises. This calls for particular care where the enterprise is regulated by an authority that reports to the same ministry.

We do not suggest any improper conduct; the concern is about structure. The ECA regulates the two licensed telecommunications operators, one state-owned and one private, and its decisions on spectrum, licensing, interconnection, infrastructure sharing, market power and competition directly affect their positions. When ownership, sector policy and regulatory oversight sit in the same ministry, the main risk is not actual bias but reduced market confidence in the regulator’s neutrality, which investors will take into account.

Corporate governance. The same structure raises governance questions for Ethio telecom itself. Since its public share offering, Ethio telecom has shareholders other than the State. Its directors owe duties to the company and all its shareholders under the State-Owned Enterprises Proclamation No. 1314/2024 and, where applicable, the duties of loyalty and conflict disclosure under the Commercial Code Proclamation No. 1243/2021. A director who also holds public office with policy or oversight responsibilities in the sector may find it difficult to reconcile those roles. Clear board procedures would help: disclosure of any public office held by a director, recusal from matters involving the ECA or MInT, and approval of related-party matters by independent directors.

4.3. How the Change Compares with International Practice

Several international standards address how a communications regulator should be positioned in relation to government and the operators it regulates. None binds Ethiopia directly, but investors and trading partners will use them as a benchmark:

  • WTO Reference Paper (1996), Section 5. The regulator must be separate from, and not accountable to, any telecommunications operator, and must treat all market participants impartially. It applies to WTO Members that have adopted it in their commitments; whether it will appear in Ethiopia’s accession commitments should be checked once these are available.
  • EU Electronic Communications Code (Directive (EU) 2018/1972), Articles 6 to 9. Regulators must be legally and functionally independent of operators, with structural separation where the State owns or controls an operator. They must not take instructions from other bodies, must be protected by clear appointment and dismissal rules, and must have separate, published annual budgets.
  • OECD, Being an Independent Regulator (2016). Regulators will interact with ministries, parliament and industry; the key is to prevent undue influence at critical points such as appointments, budgets and day-to-day dealings with government.
  • OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2024 revision), Chapter III. The State’s role as owner should be clearly separated from its role as regulator and policy-maker, taking account of both actual and perceived conflicts of interest.
  • ITU and World Bank guidance. A regulator separate from both industry and government is the recommended model for liberalized markets, combined with accountability through consultation, reasoned decisions and review.

Reporting to a ministry is not in itself inconsistent with independence, provided individual regulatory decisions are protected and conflicts of interest are managed. The question is whether the New Proclamation provides those safeguards.

4.4. Assessment Against the Benchmarks

BenchmarkPosition under the New Proclamation (as drafted)Open point
Regulator separate from, and not accountable to, an operator (WTO Reference Paper s. 5)The ECA is accountable to a ministry, not to Ethio telecom. Formally, it is not accountable to a supplier.Whether separation holds in substance where officials of the supervising ministry hold board or ownership-side roles in the operator.
Separation of ownership from regulation and policy (EU Code Art. 6; OECD SOE Guidelines III)Sector policy and regulatory accountability sit in MInT. Art. 70 places Ethiopian Investment Holdings under the State-Owned Enterprises Proclamation No. 1314/2024.No express rule separates any ownership-side role of the ministry or its officials from the ministry’s oversight of the ECA.
Independence in individual decisions (EU Code Art. 8; OECD 2016)Art. 43 bars interference in day-to-day operational management.No express protection for individual licensing, spectrum, interconnection or competition decisions.
Protected appointment and dismissal (EU Code Art. 7; OECD 2016)Silent. Proclamation No. 1148/2019 is reported to vest board appointment in the Prime Minister.Who now appoints, and on what removal grounds.
Budget autonomy and transparency (EU Code Art. 9; OECD 2016)Art. 43 allows the ministry to review plans and budgets.No ring-fencing or transparency requirement for the budget process.
Transparency and review (WTO Reference Paper; EU Code Art. 31)Not addressed. Depends on Proclamation No. 1148/2019 and general administrative law.Availability of reasoned decisions and independent appeal.

4.5. Possible Clarifications

The New Proclamation clearly places the ECA under MInT. The issues above can be addressed without changing that decision, by setting clear limits on ministerial oversight. Useful clarifications would include: (i) aligning Proclamation No. 1148/2019 with Article 56 of the New Proclamation, by amendment or Council of Ministers regulation, and confirming whether MInT’s oversight is exclusive; (ii) a statutory rule protecting individual decisions on licensing, spectrum, interconnection, disputes and competition from instruction; (iii) published disclosure and recusal rules for officials of the ministry or the ECA who sit on the board of a regulated entity; (iv) separating board roles in regulated state-owned operators from offices that oversee the regulator, or using the Article 11 mechanism; and (v) merit-based appointments, fixed terms, removal only on defined grounds, a transparent budget process, published reasoned decisions and access to independent appeal. We will monitor whether any of these points are addressed in implementing legislation.

5. Other Regulators Affected

5.1. Ethiopian Capital Market Authority

ECMA now reports to the Ministry of Finance rather than the Prime Minister (Art. 62). For capital-markets, banking and corporate clients, this may matter as much as the ECA change. ECMA licenses and supervises service providers, issuers and market infrastructure, some of which are partly state-owned, so the conflict-of-interest test in Article 11 is relevant here too. The New Proclamation does not amend ECMA’s establishing law, the Ethiopian Capital Market Proclamation No. 1248/2021, and does not say whether pending licence applications, fit-and-proper approvals and other matters before ECMA are affected. Clients with matters before ECMA should confirm the position once the official text is published.

5.2. Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority

The competition authority now sits under the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration (Art. 42). Because it administers merger control under the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013, the change is relevant to M&A transactions. Parties to pending or planned transactions should confirm which body receives merger notifications during the transition, whether filings already made remain valid, and whether existing clearances are affected.

6. Conclusion

Proclamation No. 1440/2026 simplifies the federal executive and reduces the Prime Minister’s direct portfolio. For most institutions the change is administrative. For the ECA it is more significant: a regulator created to open up a former monopoly now reports to a ministry, without clear rules separating the State’s ownership of the incumbent from oversight of the regulator. Similar questions arise for ECMA and the competition authority.

The New Proclamation includes useful safeguards, notably the Article 11 conflict-of-interest test and the Article 43 non-interference rule. Gaps remain, however: the relationship with the ECA’s establishing law is unresolved, appointments and budget are not addressed, and individual regulatory decisions are not expressly protected. Clarifying these points would improve legal certainty and investor confidence at a time when Ethiopia is seeking both telecommunications investment and WTO membership.

This article is general information and not legal advice. Contact us about your specific situation.

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