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Carbon Markets in Ethiopia, Part 2: Carbon Credits, Emission Permits, and Carbon Offsets

By Haymanot & Advocates 18 November 2026 11 min read

Green highland valley with a stream in Ethiopia

Three Instruments of Carbon Market: Carbon Credits, Emission Permits, and Carbon Offsets

Introduction

Carbon markets are talked about constantly in climate and finance circles, yet their vocabulary is frequently misused, even by experienced practitioners. “Carbon credit,” “emission permit,” and “carbon offset” are not synonyms. They describe three legally and financially distinct instruments, each with different origins, different purposes, and fundamentally different implications for environmental integrity.

Getting this right matters. In Ethiopia’s emerging carbon market framework, the Forest Carbon Trading Directive No. 1122/2025 and the National Carbon Market Strategy each operate within the logic of specific instrument types. Misunderstanding the distinctions can mean the difference between a transaction that counts toward Ethiopia’s national climate targets and one that inadvertently undermines those targets.[1]

This piece will unpack the three instruments, explain how they interact under the Paris Agreement, and locate each within Ethiopia’s evolving legal architecture.

The global carbon market: a brief description

Before examining the instruments individually, it helps to understand the landscape they operate in. Carbon markets function across two broad tracks: compliance markets, where participation is legally required, and voluntary markets, where participation is discretionary but commercially or reputationally motivated.

The global voluntary carbon market (VCM) contracted in 2023-2024 following intense media scrutiny over credit quality, but has since stabilized with a marked shift toward higher-integrity instruments. Transaction volume dropped roughly 25% between 2023 and 2024, yet the number of credits actually retired, used to compensate for emissions, remained stable at approximately 180 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. The market is smaller but more demanding.[2] In the voluntary carbon market, Ethiopia has registered activities under all key independent crediting programmes such as the Gold Standard, the Verified Carbon Standard, and Plan Vivo.[3]

Meanwhile, the compliance market, particularly the EU Emissions Trading System, has demonstrated that well-designed carbon pricing can drive structural emissions reductions at scale. Since its launch in 2005, the EU ETS has helped cut emissions from European power and industry by approximately 47%.[4] These are the mechanics that Ethiopia’s policymakers should consider when designing the country’s carbon market architecture.

  1. The Three Instruments of the Carbon Market
  2. The Carbon Credit

A carbon credit is a tradable certificate, issued by a government-supervised mechanism or an accredited private standard body, representing one metric tonne of CO₂ equivalent (tCO₂e) that has been reduced, avoided, or removed from the atmosphere through a verified mitigation activity.[5] It is, at its core, a unit of past performance: something that has already happened and been independently confirmed.

The legal and technical requirements for a valid carbon credit are demanding. Each of the following standards must be satisfied before a credit can be issued:

  • Additionality: The emission reduction would not have occurred without the financial incentive that the carbon credit provides. This is the most contested and important standard in carbon markets. A non-additional credit is simply a payment for something that would have happened anyway, with no climate benefit. Ethiopia’s National Carbon Market Strategy defines additionality as the condition where, at the time of the decision to implement a mitigation activity, the outcomes of that activity would not have occurred in the absence of the incentives created by carbon credit revenues. Critics argue that many claimed reductions are not genuinely additional, meaning credits are issued for emissions that would have been reduced anyway, undermining the environmental integrity of the entire market.[6]
  • Measurability: The reduction must be quantifiable against a credible, pre-defined baseline scenario,[7] a hypothetical picture of what emissions would have been without the project.
  • Permanence: The reduction must be durable over time. For forestry credits, this is particularly challenging, where stored carbon can be released by fire, drought, or disease.[8]
  • Verifiability: An independent, accredited third party must confirm the reduction occurred, in accordance with an approved methodology.[9] Directive No. 1122/2025 defines the Verification Body as an independent, accredited entity authorised to verify the accuracy, completeness, and credibility of mitigation activities under approved international forest carbon trading standards.
  • Uniqueness: The credit must be issued once, used once, and permanently retired in a registry. No reuse. No double-counting across buyers or jurisdictions.[10]

Ethiopia’s Forest Carbon Trading Directive No. 1122/2025 defines a Forest Carbon Credit as “a tradable unit representing one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions reduced or sequestered from the atmosphere, verified and issued in accordance with a Forest Carbon Credit Project or Jurisdictional Forest Carbon Credit Program.”[11] This definition incorporates the core international requirements at the domestic level, a deliberate alignment that makes Ethiopia’s forest credits legible to international buyers.

The Emission Permit

An emission permit, also called an allowance, is fundamentally different from a carbon credit. It is not a certificate of a past reduction. It is a prospective authorisation to emit a defined quantity of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), issued by a government regulator under a cap-and-trade system.[12]

The mechanism works as follows: a regulator sets a total cap, a ceiling on total GHG emissions across all covered sectors, on emissions across covered sectors.[13] Allowances equal to the cap are distributed to regulated entities, either by free allocation (based on historical emissions or sector benchmarks) or by auction (where entities bid competitively, generating government revenue that can be recycled into clean energy transition programs). At the end of each compliance period, every covered entity must surrender allowances equal to its actual verified emissions:

  • Surplus Allowance: (emit less than the allocation) can be sold on the carbon market.
  • Shortfall: (emit more than the allocation) requires the entity to purchase additional allowances from other participants or, where the system permits, from carbon credit offsets.

The price signal created by this trading mechanism, the carbon price, incentivises emission reductions wherever they are cheapest across the regulated economy. This is the defining efficiency argument for market-based climate policy: abatement occurs first where it costs least, reducing the total economic cost of achieving a given emissions target.

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the world’s largest carbon market, operates on this model, covering power generation and heavy industry across all EU member states.[14] By 2023, it had helped bring down emissions from European power and industrial plants by approximately 47% compared to 2005 levels.[15] Up to 57% of allowances are now distributed by auction rather than free allocation, generating substantial government revenues (by mid-2025, the EU ETS had raised €245 billion in revenues from the sale of emission allowances since its launch).[16]

Ethiopia does not currently operate a cap-and-trade system. However, the National Carbon Market Strategy contemplates exploring targeted carbon pricing instruments that could eventually create domestic compliance demand, including mandatory carbon charges on incoming international flights and emissions-based import duties on high-emission vehicles.[17] If introduced, these instruments would create domestic demand for Ethiopian carbon credits as offsets, adding a compliance market dimension to what is currently a pure voluntary and Article 6 bilateral framework. [18]Hence, architecture being built today is not only for participation in international markets; it is also laying the groundwork for a domestic compliance system in the future.

The Carbon Offset

A carbon offset is not a separate instrument; it is a functional description of how a carbon credit is used. When a regulated entity uses a carbon credit to compensate for its own emissions rather than directly reducing them, that credit is functioning as an offset.[19]

This distinction carries a critical legal implication. Offsets do not reduce total emissions in the regulated system; they shift the location of abatement. A factory in another country that buys Ethiopian forest credits to meet its emission obligation has not reduced its own emissions; it has paid for reductions in Ethiopia. Thus, the regulated entity continues to emit, and the reduction elsewhere is credited against it. The environmental integrity of an offset, therefore, depends entirely on the quality of the underlying carbon credit:[20]

  • High-quality + offset use = environmentally neutral at the global level. The buyer emits one tonne; a verified one tonne reduction elsewhere compensates. The net effect is zero change in global emissions.
  • Low-quality credit + offset use = net worsening emissions. The buyer keeps emitting; the purported reduction elsewhere is not real. The offset allows the buyer to avoid reducing its own emissions without generating a genuine equivalent reduction anywhere else.

This is why carbon market integrity, the quality assurance systems behind credit issuance, is not a technical nicety but a legal and environmental imperative. Low-quality offsets have been at the centre of controversies that have periodically damaged VCM credibility, including disputed claims about large REDD+ programs in recent years. Ethiopia’s commitment to high-integrity market participation, reflected in both the National Carbon Market Strategy and the mandatory disclosure requirements of Directive No. 1122/2025, is directly responsive to these global integrity concerns.

The Convergence of the Instruments

The Paris Agreement introduced universal NDC’s (Nationally Determined Contributions). Accordingly, every country, including Ethiopia, now has a nationally determined emissions reduction target. Ethiopia’s updated NDC (2021) commits to reducing GHG emissions by 68.8% by 2030 relative to the business-as-usual scenario, with 80% of that target conditional on international support.[21]

Under the Paris Agreement’s Article 6, when one country’s carbon credits are transferred to another country for use toward its climate targets, or used to meet international compliance obligations like Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), the host country must apply a compensating adjustment, ensuring the same tonne of reduction is not claimed by both countries toward their respective NDCs.[22]

This accounting rule is the technical foundation of the entire international carbon market. Without it, a single emissions reduction could be counted toward the NDCs of both the country where it occurred and the country that purchased it, a form of double-counting that would make global emissions accounting meaningless. It is also why Ethiopia’s domestic legal architecture matters: without a functioning authorisation process, Ethiopian credits cannot be used for Article 6 transactions or CORSIA compliance, regardless of their environmental quality. The credits exist, but they cannot be transferred into compliance markets at full legal value.

Moreover, the Paris Agreement has introduced a system named the Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome (ITMO). An ITMO is not simply a carbon credit. It is a real, verified, and additional emission reduction or removal that a host country has formally authorised for transfer to another country or entity for use toward NDC or other international mitigation purposes.

The distinction between a carbon credit and an ITMO is legally significant: all ITMOs are carbon credits (they represent verified emission reductions), but not all carbon credits are ITMOs (only those that have received host country authorization and will be subject to corresponding adjustments). A VCM credit sold on the voluntary market without Article 6.2 authorization is a carbon credit; it is not an ITMO unless and until the host country authorises it for international transfer with the attendant corresponding adjustment. For Ethiopia, this means that the authority to issue ITMOs rests exclusively with the Ministry of Planning and Development (MoPD), designated as Ethiopia’s DNA[23] under the Paris Agreement.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Stakes

For Ethiopia, each of the three instruments maps onto a concrete set of legal obligations, commercial opportunities, and sovereign choices that the country must navigate simultaneously. The Directive No.1122/2025 signals awareness of this complexity by defining Forest Carbon Credit Trading as the purchasing or selling of “all rights, title, and legal benefits” of credits in accordance with “a recognised national or international carbon trading mechanism”.[24] Accordingly, the directive governs the generation, registration, and trading of forest carbon credits and, in doing so, establishes the quality standards on which international buyer confidence depends.[25] But a carbon credit, however well-designed, does not automatically access all markets. Its legal status, authorized or unauthorised, determines which buyer can purchase it and at what price.

Moreover, Ethiopia’s engagement with carbon offsets, the third instrument, is most immediately visible through Ethiopian Airlines. The National Carbon Market Strategy explicitly identifies Ethiopian Airlines as a potential reliable domestic buyer of carbon credits, noting that as a leading international carrier, it may participate in the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) across multiple covered route pairs. The CORSIA requires airlines to purchase and cancel eligible carbon credits to offset CO₂ emissions above a defined baseline. As of 2026, 130 states participate in CORSIA.[26] Ethiopian Airlines, one of the continent’s largest carriers, is subject to these obligations for its international routes. Critically, for a credit to be CORSIA-eligible, the host country must formally authorise it and apply a corresponding adjustment under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, ensuring the same tonne is not counted twice. Ethiopia’s developing authorization framework for its carbon credits directly determines whether its project developers can supply this compliance market and at what price premium.

The National Carbon Market Strategy contemplates a broader architecture that includes elements of all three instrument types over time: carbon credits under both Article 6, the voluntary carbon market; potential domestic carbon pricing instruments; and offset demand from Ethiopian Airlines under CORSIA.[27] Understanding which instrument applies in which context is the starting point for any material engagement with Ethiopia’s carbon market framework.

Conclusion

The precision of language in carbon markets is necessary as it has legal and financial substance. The Paris Agreement’s introduction of universal NDCs and the corresponding adjustment mechanism transformed the rules for all three carbon market instruments. An offset used toward NDC purposes requires a corresponding adjustment that VCM transactions historically did not.

As Ethiopia builds its carbon market legal architecture, with the National Carbon Market Strategy setting the policy framework, Directive No. 1122/2025 establishing the forest sector operational rules, and the forthcoming national carbon market law set to integrate these layers[28], the practitioners, investors, and project developers who understand these distinctions will be best positioned to engage effectively with the emerging framework and avoid the integrity pitfalls that have damaged carbon markets globally.

In Part 3, we examine details of the international rules for the carbon market, including Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement and CORSIA.

  1. Forest Carbon Trading Directive No. 1122/2025 [hereinafter Directive No. 1122/2025], Art. 2(2)–(5); NCMS 2025, Glossary. ↑

  2. Jennifer L, A Recap of the Voluntary Carbon Market: Quality Over Quantity, December 5, 2025, https://carboncredits.com/a-recap-of-the-voluntary-carbon-market-quality-over-quantity/ ↑

  3. NCMS 2025, s 2.1 ↑

  4. Energy, Climate change, Environment, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/about-eu-ets_en ↑

  5. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“carbon credit”). ↑

  6. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“additionality”). ↑

  7. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“baseline”). ↑

  8. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“reversal”). ↑

  9. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“verification”). ↑

  10. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“carbon registry”); Directive No. 1122/2025, Art. 12. ↑

  11. Directive No. 1122/2025, Art. 2(2). ↑

  12. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“emission allowance”) ↑

  13. NCMS 2025, Glossary (“cap-and-trade scheme”). ↑

  14. World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024 (World Bank Group, Washington DC, 2024). ↑

  15. EU, Energy, Climate change, Environment, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/about-eu-ets_en ↑

  16. Trends in carbon intensity and the macroeconomic role of the EU Emissions Trading System, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/trends-carbon-intensity-and-macroeconomic-role-eu-emissions-trading-system_en ↑

  17. NCMS 2025, s 4.6. ↑

  18. NCMS 2025, s 4.6 (carbon pricing instruments under exploration). ↑

  19. Carbon markets and sustainable development: Bridging economic, environmental and technological divides, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ldc2024_ch1_en.pdf ↑

  20. NCMS 2025, s 2.2. ↑

  21. NCMS, s 2.1 ↑

  22. Paris Agreement, Art. 6.2; NCMS 2025, Glossary (“corresponding adjustment”); EASA, ‘CORSIA and Article 6’ (2025). ↑

  23. United Nations, Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article-64-mechanism/national-authorities ; UNFCCC https://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/DNA/view.html?CID=71 ↑

  24. Directive No. 1122/2025, Art. 2(5); ↑

  25. Directive No. 1122/2025, Art. 2(2)–(5) ↑

  26. Offsetting Co2 Emission with CORSIA, https://www.iata.org/en/programs/sustainability/corsia/ ↑

  27. NCMS 2025, S 4.2, S 4.3(4), S 4.5. ↑

  28. Green Growth Institute, https://gggi.org/ethiopia-concludes-nationwide-consultations-on-landmark-carbon-market-proclamation/ ↑

This article is general information and not legal advice. Contact us about your specific situation.

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